The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria by Aziz, Haris et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
06
66
5v
4 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
7 F
eb
 20
17
The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and
Equilibria
Haris Aziz
NICTA and University of New South Wales, Australia
haris.aziz@nicta.com.au
Simina Braˆnzei
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
simina.branzei@gmail.com
Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Oxford University, United Kingdom
aris.filos-ratsikas@cs.ox.ac.uk
Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen
Aarhus University, Denmark
ssf@cs.au.dk
Abstract
The Adjusted Winner procedure is an important fair division mechanism proposed by
Brams and Taylor for allocating goods between two parties. It has been used in practice for
divorce settlements and analyzing political disputes. Assuming truthful declaration of the val-
uations, it computes an allocation that is envy-free, equitable and Pareto optimal.
We show that Adjusted Winner admits several elegant characterizations, which further shed
light on the outcomes reached with strategic agents. We find that the procedure may not admit
pure Nash equilibria in either the discrete or continuous variants, but is guaranteed to have
ǫ-Nash equilibria for each ǫ > 0. Moreover, under informed tie-breaking, exact pure Nash
equilibria always exist, are Pareto optimal, and their social welfare is at least 3/4 of the optimal.
1 Introduction
The Adjusted Winner procedure was introduced by Brams and Taylor ([3]) as a highly desirable
mechanism for allocating multiple divisible resources among two parties. The procedure requires
the participants to declare their preferences over the items and the outcome satisfies strong fairness
and efficiency properties. Adjusted Winner has been advocated as a fair division rule for divorce
settlements [3], international border conflicts [19], political issues [8, 15], real estate disputes [13],
water disputes [14], deciding debate formats [12] and various negotiation settings [4, 18]. For
example, it has been shown that the agreement reached during Jimmy Carter’s presidency between
Israel and Egypt is very close to what AdjustedWinner would have predicted [5]. AdjustedWinner
has been patented by New York University and licensed to the law firm Fair Outcomes, Inc [10].
Although the merits of Adjusted Winner have been discussed in a large body of literature, the
procedure is still not fully understood theoretically. We provide two novel characterizations, to-
gether with an alternative interpretation that turns out to be very useful for analyzing the procedure.
Moreover, as observed already in [2], the procedure is susceptible to manipulation. However,
fairness and efficiency are only guaranteed when the participants declare their preferences honestly.
In a review of a well-known book on Adjusted Winner by Brams and Taylor [4], Nalebuff [16]
highlights the need for research in this direction:
..thus we have to hypothesize how they (the players) would have played the game and
where they would have ended up.
We answer these questions by studying the existence, structure, and properties of pure Nash equi-
libria of the procedure. Until now, our understanding of the strategic aspects has been limited to the
case of two items [2] and experimental predictions [7]; our work identifies conditions under which
Nash equilibria exist and provides theoretical guarantees for the performance of the procedure in
equilibrium.
1.1 Contributions
We start by presenting the first characterizations of Adjusted Winner. We show that among all pro-
tocols that split at most one item, it is the only one that satisfies Pareto-efficiency and equitability.
Under the same condition, we further show that it is equivalent to the protocol that always outputs
a maxmin allocation.
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Continuous
Procedure
Lexicographic
tie-breaking
Informed
tie-breaking
pure Nash ✗ ✓
ǫ-Nash ✓ ✓
Discrete
Procedure
Lexicographic
tie-breaking
Informed
tie-breaking
pure Nash ✗ ✓
ǫ-Nash ✓(∗) ✓
Table 1: Existence of pure Nash equilibria in Adjusted Winner. The (*) result holds when the
number of points is chosen appropriately.
Next, we obtain a complete picture for the existence of pure Nash equilibria in Adjusted Win-
ner. We find the following that neither the discrete nor the continuous variants of the procedure
are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. However, the continuous variant of the procedure has
ǫ-Nash equilibria, for every ǫ > 0, while the discrete variant has ǫ-equilibria when the number of
points is chosen appropriately, in a way that allows the players to sketch their valuations precisely
enough. Additionally, under informed tie-breaking, exact pure Nash equilibria always exist for
both variants of the procedure.
Finally, we prove that the pure Nash equilibria of Adjusted Winner are envy-free and Pareto
optimal with respect to the true valuations and that their social welfare is at least 3/4 of that of the
intended outcome of the procedure. Our results concerning the existence or non-existence of pure
Nash equilibria are summarized in Table 1.
2 Background
We begin by introducing the classical fair division model for which the Adjusted Winner pro-
cedure was developed [2]. Let there be two players, Alice and Bob, that are trying to split a
set M = {1, . . . , m} of divisible items. The players have preferences over the items given by
numerical values that express their level of satisfaction. Formally, let a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) and
b = (b1, . . . , bm) denote their valuation vectors, where aj and bj are the values assigned by Alice
and Bob to item j, respectively.
An allocationW = (WA,WB) is an assignment of fractions of items (or bundles) to the play-
ers, where WA = (w
1
A, . . . , w
m
A ) ∈ [0, 1]
m and WB = (w
1
B, . . . , w
m
B ) ∈ [0, 1]
m are the allocations
of Alice and Bob, respectively.
The players have additive utility over the items. Alice’s utility for a bundleWA, given that her
valuation is a, is: ua(WA) =
∑
j∈M aj · w
j
A. Bob’s utility is defined similarly. The players are
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weighted equally, such that their utility for receiving all the resources is the same:∑
i∈M
ai =
∑
i∈M
bi.
There are two main settings studied in this context: discrete and continuous valuations. In the
discrete setting, valuations are positive natural numbers that add up to some integer P and can be
interpreted as points (or coins of equal size) that the players use to acquire the items. For ease
of notation, we will consider the equivalent interpretation of valuations as rationals with common
denominatorP , where the valuations sum to 1. In the continuous setting, the valuations are positive
real numbers, which are without loss of generality normalized to sum to 1. These normalizations
make procedures invariant to any rescaling of the bids [10, 1].
2.1 The Adjusted Winner Procedure
The Adjusted Winner procedure works as follows. Alice and Bob are asked by a mediator to state
their valuations a and b, after which the next two phases are executed.
Phase 1: For every item i, if ai > bi then give the item to Alice; otherwise give it to
Bob. The resulting allocation is (WA,WB) and without loss of generality, ua(WA) ≥
ub(WB).
Phase 2: Order the items won by Alice increasingly by the ratio ai/bi:
ak1
bk1
≤ . . . ≤
akr
bkr
. From left to right, continuously transfer fractions of items from Alice to Bob,
until an allocation (W ′A,W
′
B) where both players have the same utility is produced:
ua(W
′
A) = ub(W
′
B).
Let AW (a,b) denote the allocation produced by Adjusted Winner on inputs (a,b), where
AWA(a,b) and AWB(a,b) are the bundles received by Alice and Bob. Note that the procedure
is defined for strictly positive valuations, so the ratios are finite and strictly positive numbers.
Examples can be found on the Adjusted Winner website1 as well as in [2].
Adjusted Winner produces allocations that are envy-free, equitable, Pareto optimal, and mini-
mally fractional. An allocation W is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation that
strictly improves one player’s utility without degrading the other player. AllocationW is equitable
if the utilities of the players are equal: ua(WA) = ub(WB), envy-free if no player would prefer the
other player’s bundle, and minimally fractional if at most one item is split.
1http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner/.
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Envy-freeness of the procedure implies proportionality, where an allocation is proportional if
each player receives a bundle worth at least half of its utility for all the items. A procedure is called
envy-free if it always outputs an envy-free allocation (similarly for the other properties).
3 Characterizations
In this section, we provide two characterizations of Adjusted Winner2 for both the discrete and
continuous variants. We begin with a different interpretation of the procedure that is useful for
analyzing its properties.
An allocation is ordered if it can be produced by sorting the items in decreasing order of the
valuation ratios ai/bi and placing a boundary line somewhere (possibly splitting an item), such that
Alice gets the entire bundle to the left of the line and Bob gets the remainder:
ak1
bk2
≥
ak2
bk2
≥ · · · ≥
aki
bki
≥︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alice’s allocation
∣∣∣∣ ≥ aki+1bki+1 ≥ · · · ≥ akmbkm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob’s allocation
The placement of the boundary line could lead either to an integral or a minimally fractional
allocation. Note that the allocation that gives all the items to Alice is also ordered (but admittedly
unfair).
It is clear to see that Adjusted Winner produces an ordered allocation (using some tie-breaking
rule for items with equal ratios) with the property that the boundary line is appropriately placed to
guarantee equitability. This is the way we will be interpreting the procedure for the remainder of
the paper. We start by characterizing Pareto optimal allocations.
Lemma 1. For any valuations (a,b) and any tie-breaking rule, an allocation W is not Pareto
optimal if and only if there exist items i and j such that Alice gets a non-zero fraction (possibly
whole) of j, Bob gets a non-zero fraction (possibly whole) of i, and aibj > ajbi.
Proof. ( ⇐= ) If such items i, j exist, then consider the exchange in which Bob gives λi > 0 of
item i to Alice and Alice gives λj > 0 of item j to Bob, where:
bi
bj
λi < λj <
ai
aj
λi
2 The results here refer to the case when the players report their true valuations to the mediator. We discuss the
strategic aspects of the procedure in Section 4.
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Since ai/aj > bi/bj , such λi and λj do exist. Then Alice’s net change in utility is:
aiλi − ajλj > aiλi − aj
ai
aj
λi = 0,
while Bob’s net change is:
bjλj − biλi > bjλj − bi(λj
bj
bi
) > bjλj − bjλj = 0.
Thus the allocation is not Pareto optimal.
( =⇒ ) If the allocation W is not Pareto optimal, then Alice and Bob can exchange positive
fractions of items to get a Pareto improvement.
Consider such an exchange and let SA be the set of items for which positive fractions are given
by Alice to Bob. Let SB be defined similarly for Bob. Without loss of generality, SA and SB are
disjoint; otherwise we could just consider the net transfer of any items that are in both SA and SB .
Let j ∈ SA be the item with the lowest ratio aj/bj , and i ∈ SB with the highest ratio ai/bi.
If aibj > ajbi then we are done. Otherwise, assume by contradiction that for each item k ∈ SA
and l ∈ SB it holds akbl ≥ albk. Then ak/bk ≥ al/bl; but then any Pareto improving exchange
involving the transfer of items from SA and SB is only possible if at least one player gets a larger
fraction of items without the other player getting a smaller fraction, which is impossible.
By Lemma 1, a Pareto optimal allocation can be obtained by sorting the items by the ratios of
the valuations and drawing a boundary line somewhere. No matter where the boundary line is, the
allocation is Pareto optimal (even if not equitable); thus an allocation is Pareto optimal and splits
at most one item if and only if it is ordered. From this we obtain our first characterization.
Theorem 1. Adjusted Winner is the only Pareto optimal, equitable, and minimally fractional pro-
cedure. Any ordered equitable allocation can be produced by Adjusted Winner under some tie-
breaking rule.
Note that both Pareto optimality and equitability are necessary for the characterization. By
restricting to Pareto optimal allocations only, then even the allocation that gives all the items to
one player is Pareto optimal, while by restricting to equitable allocations only, even an allocation
that throws away all the items is equitable. Similarly when the players have identical utilities
for some items, then there exist Pareto optimal and equitable allocations that split more than one
item. For example, if the two players have identical utilities over all items, then the allocation
that gives half of each item to each player is equitable and Pareto optimal. However, in the case
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that the valuation are such that ai/bi 6= aj/bj for all items i 6= j, then Adjusted Winner is exactly
characterized by Pareto optimality and equitability.
We say that an allocation is maxmin if it maximizes the minimum utility over both players.
Theorem 2. If the valuations satisfy ai/bi 6= aj/bj for all items i 6= j, then the only Pareto optimal
and equitable allocation is the result of Adjusted Winner.
Proof. Recall first that an allocation is maxmin if it maximizes the minimum utility of the players.
Notice that AW achieves the same level of utility for the players. Now assume there exists an
allocation (α, β) that is Pareto optimal and equitable, but not a result of AW. Then the allocation is
not ordered and there exist at least two items i and j such that both players get a fraction of them.
This contradicts Lemma 1, and so (α, β) does not exist.
From Lemma 3.3 [6], an allocation is maxmin if and only if it is Pareto optimal and equitable.
Together with Theorem 1, this leads to another characterization.
Theorem 3. Adjusted Winner is equivalent to the procedure that always outputs a maxmin and
minimally fractional allocation.
4 Equilibrium Existence
In this section, we study Adjusted Winner when the players are strategic, that is, their reported
valuations are not necessarily the same as their actual valuations. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) and
y = (y1, y2, . . . , xm) be the strategies (i.e. declared valuations) of Alice and Bob respectively. Call
(x,y) a strategy profile. We will refer to a and b as the true values of Alice and Bob. Note that
since strategies are reported valuations they are positive numbers that sum to 1.
Since the input to AdjustedWinner is now a strategy profile (x,y) instead of (a,b), this means
that the properties of the procedure are only guaranteed to hold with respect to the declared valua-
tions, and not necessarily the true ones3.
A strategy profile (x,y) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if no player can increase its utility by more
than ǫ by deviating to a different (pure) strategy. For ǫ = 0, we obtain a pure Nash equilibrium.
The main result of this section is that Adjusted Winner is only guaranteed to have ǫ-Nash
equilibria when ǫ > 0 using standard tie-breaking. For the discrete case, this is achieved by the
3We will show that in the equilibrium, the procedure guarantees some of the properties with respect to the true
values as well.
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center setting the number of points or equivalently the denominator large enough. Furthermore, we
prove that when using an appropriate rule for settling ties between items with equal ratios xi/yi,
the procedure does admit exact pure Nash equilibria. We start our investigations from the standard
tie-breaking rules.
4.1 Lexicographic Tie-Breaking
The classical formulation of Adjusted Winner resolves ties in an arbitrary deterministic way, for
example by ordering the items lexicographically, such that items with lower indices come first.
4.1.1 Continuous Strategies
First, we consider the case of continuous strategies. We start with the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Adjusted Winner with continuous strategies is not guaranteed to have pure Nash
equilibria.
Proof. Take an instance with two items and valuations (a,b), where b1 > a1 > a2 > b2 > 0. As-
sume by contradiction there is a pure Nash equilibrium at strategies (x,y), where x = (x, 1 − x)
and y = (y, 1− y). We study a few cases and show the players can always improve.
Case 1: (x 6= y). Without loss of generality x > y (the case x < y is similar). Then there exists
δ ∈ Rwith x−δ > y ⇒ 1−x+δ < 1−y, and Alice can improve by playing x′ = (x−δ, 1−x+δ),
as the boundary line moves to the left of its former position.
Case 2: (x = y < 1/2). Here both players report higher values on the item they like less;
Alice’s allocation is (1, λ) while Bob’s is (0, 1 − λ), for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Then ∃ δ ∈ R with
x+ δ < 1/2. By playing y′ = (x+ δ, 1− x− δ), Bob gets (1, 1− λ′), for some λ′ ∈ (0, 1). This
is a strict improvement since a1 > a2.
Case 3: (x = y > 1/2). Both players report higher values on the item they like more. Bob gets
(1− 1
2x
, 1) and Alice gets ( 1
2x
, 0), with utilities:
ua(AW (x,y)) =
a1
2x
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and
ub(AW (x,y)) =
(
1−
1
2x
)
b1 + b2.
Let δ ∈ (0,min(1− x, 2x− 1)) such that:
δ < max
{
4x(x− a1)
2x− a1
,
4x(b1 − x)
2x− b1
}
.
Observe that since b1 > a1 and 2x−a1 and 2x− b1 are positive, at least one of x−a1 and b1−x is
strictly positive and by continuity of the strategy space, such a δ exists. Now consider alternative
profiles (x′,y) = ((x − δ, 1 − x + δ), (x, 1 − x)) and (x,y′) = ((x, 1 − x), (x + δ, 1 − x − δ)).
Since δ < 2x−1, the first item is still the item that gets split in the new profile. Using the identities
a1 + a2 = b1 + b2 = 1 and the assumption that (x,y) is a pure Nash equilibrium, we have that{
a1
(
1− 1
2x
− 1
2x−δ
)
+ a2 ≤ 0 =⇒ δ ≥
4x(x−a1)
2x−a1
b1
(
1− 1
2x
− 1
2x+δ
)
+ b2 ≥ 0 =⇒ δ ≥
4x(b1−x)
2x−b1
We obtain a contradiction, so this case cannot occur.
Case 4: (x = y = 1/2). Alice and Bob get allocations (1, 0) and (0, 1), respectively. Let
0 < δ < (b1−b2)
b2
and consider the strategy y′ = (x+ δ, 1 − x − δ) of Bob. Using y′, Bob gets the
allocation ( 1
δ+1
, 0), which is better than (0, 1). Since b1 > b2, such δ exists.
As none of the cases (1)− (4) are stable, the procedure has no pure Nash equilibrium.
However, we show that Adjusted Winner admits approximate Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5. Each instance of Adjusted Winner with continuous strategies has an ǫ-Nash equilib-
rium, for every ǫ > 0.
Proof. Let (a,b) be any instance. We show there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in which Alice
plays her true valuations and Bob plays a small perturbation of Alice’s valuations. More formally,
we show there exist ǫ1, . . . , ǫm, such that an ǫ-equilibrium is obtained when Alice plays a =
(a1, . . . , am) and Bob plays a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜m), where a˜i = ai + ǫi for each item i ∈ [m] and∑m
i=1 ǫi = 0. The theorem will follow from the next two lemmas.
Lemma 2. For any pair of strategies (a, a˜), where |ai− a˜i| < ǫ/m for all i ∈ [m], Alice’s strategy
is an ǫ-best response.
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Proof. Since the procedure is envy-free, Alice gets at least half of the total value by being truthful
regardless of Bob’s strategy, and so ua(AWA(a, a˜)) ≥ 1/2. The allocation must also be envy-free
according to Bob’s declared valuation profile a˜, and so ua˜(AWB(a, a˜)) ≥ 1/2.
Since strategies a and a˜ are ǫ-close, that is
∑
i |ai − a˜i| < ǫ, then their evaluations of the same
allocation, namely AWB(a, a˜), are also close:
ua(AWB(a, a˜)) ≥ ua˜(AWB(a, a˜))− ǫ ≥ 1/2− ǫ
It follows that 1/2 ≤ ua(AWA(a, a˜)) ≤ 1/2 + ǫ. Moreover, Alice cannot use some other strategy
a′ to force an allocation that gives her more than 1/2 + ǫ; otherwise, Bob’s utility as measured by
a˜ under strategy profiles (a′, a˜) would be strictly less than 1/2− ǫ, contradicting the envy-freeness
of the procedure.
Thus when Bob’s strategy is ǫ-close to Alice’s truthful strategy a, Alice has an ǫ-best response
at her truthful strategy a, which completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 3. When Alice plays a, Bob has an ǫ-best response that is ǫ-close to Alice’s strategy.
Proof. Let π = (π1, . . . , πm) be a fixed permutation of the items. Then there exist uniquely defined
index l ∈ {1, . . . , m} and λ ∈ [0, 1) such that
aπ1 + . . . aπl−1 + λaπl =
1
2
= (1− λ)aπl + aπl+1 + . . .+ aπm (1)
Note that Adjusted Winner uses lexicographic tie breaking to sort the items when there exist equal
ratios xi/yi = xj/yj , for some i 6= j. Thus the order π may never appear in an outcome of the
procedure when the players use the same strategies.
However, we show that Bob can approximate the outcome of Equation (1) arbitrarily well. We
have two cases:
Case 1: λ ∈ (0, 1). Then there exist ǫ1, . . . , ǫm such that the following conditions hold:
(i) |ǫj | < min
(
ǫ
m
,
2λapil
m
)
, for all j ∈ [m],
(ii) the items are strictly ordered by π:
api1
api1+ǫpi1
> . . . > apim
apim+ǫpim
,
(iii)
∑m
j=1 ǫj = 0, and
(iv) it’s still item πl that gets split, in a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) close to λ; that is, |λ− δ| <
ǫ
bpil
.
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Informally, Bob plays a perturbation of Alice’s truthful strategy inducing ordering π on the
items (with no ties) and splits item πl in a fraction close to λ.
Case 2: λ = 0. Again, there exist ǫ1, . . . , ǫm such that the following conditions are met:
(i) ǫj < min
(
ǫ
m
,
apil
m
)
for all j ∈ [m],
(ii) the item order is π:
api1
api1+ǫpi1
> . . . > apim
apim+ǫpim
,
(iii)
∑m
j=1 ǫj = 0, and
(iv) item πl is split in a ratio δ close to zero: |δ| <
ǫ
bpil
.
Thus Bob can approximate the outcome of Equation (1).
Now consider any ǫ-best response y of Bob; this induces some permutation of the items ac-
cording to the ratios. If y is ǫ-close to the strategy of Alice we are done. Otherwise, Bob could
change his strategy to be ǫ-close to the strategy of Alice while inducing the same permutation. This
will only improve his utility as the boundary line moves to the left.
It can be observed that there is at least one other ǫ-Nash equilibrium, at strategies (b, b˜), where
b˜ is a perturbation of Bob’s truthful profile.
4.1.2 Discrete Strategies
Even though the continuous procedure is not guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria, this does
not imply that the discrete variant should also fail to have pure Nash equilibria. However we do
find that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 6. Adjusted Winner with discrete strategies is not guaranteed to have pure Nash equi-
libria.
Proof. Consider a game with 4 items and 7 points, where Alice and Bob have valuations (1, 1, 2, 3)
and (2, 3, 1, 1), respectively. This game does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium; this fact can be
verified with a program that checks all possible configurations.
Our next theorem shows that an ǫ-Nash equilibrium always exists in the discrete case if the
number of points is set adequately, such that the players can approximately represent their true
valuations.
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Theorem 7. For any profile (a,b) and any ǫ > 0, there exists P ′ such that the procedure has an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium when the players are given P ′ points.
Proof. Let ǫ > 0, and consider any profile (a,b) with denominator P . Then if we interpret (a,b)
as a profile for the continuous setting, we get a ǫ/2-Nash equilibrium (a, a˜) from Theorem 5, where
a˜j = aj + ǫj , for all j ∈ [m].
Recall that aj, bj ∈ Q; where aj =
sj
P
and bj =
tj
P
, for some sj, tj,∈ N. We can find a rational
number ǫ′j =
qj
rj
(with qj , rj ∈ N) that approximates ǫj within
ǫ
2m
for each j ∈ [m], and such that
the ordering of the items induced by the ratios
aj
aj+ǫj
is the same as the one given by
aj
aj+ǫ′j
. Define
a˜′ such that a˜′j = aj + ǫ
′
j .
It follows that (a, a˜′) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with aj , a˜
′
j ∈ Q, for all j ∈ [m]. Thus whenever
the players have a denominator of P ′ = P ·
∏m
j=1 rj , the strategy profiles (a, a˜
′) can be represented
in the discrete procedure, so by giving P ′ points to the players, there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Informed Tie-Breaking
If the tie-breaking rule is not independent of the valuations, then both the discrete and continuous
variants of Adjusted Winner have exact pure Nash equilibria. The deterministic tie-breaking rule
under which this is possible is the one in which a fixed player (e.g. Bob), is allowed to resolve
ties by sorting them in the best possible order for him. That is, Bob evaluates all ways of sorting
the items with ties and picks the ordering that maximizes his utility, according to his true valuation
function. If there are multiple such orderings, Bob can without loss of generality select any of
them.
Now we can state the equilibrium existence theorems.
Theorem 8. Adjusted Winner with continuous strategies and informed tie-breaking is guaranteed
to have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We show that the profile (a, a) is an exact equilibrium. By envy-freeness of the procedure,
Alice gets at least half of the points at this strategy profile. Moreover, she cannot get strictly above
half, since that would violate envy-freeness from the point of view of Bob’s declared valuation,
which is also a. Thus Alice’s strategy is a best response. As argued in Theorem 5 and 7, there
exists an optimal permutation π∗ such that by playing a and sorting the items in the order π∗, Bob
can obtain the best possible utility (and as mentioned in Lemma 3, this value is achievable at these
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strategies).
Similarly, it can be shown that the strategy profile (a, a) is a pure Nash equilibrium in the
discrete procedure.
Theorem 9. Adjusted Winner with discrete strategies and informed tie-breaking is guaranteed to
have a pure Nash equilibrium.
5 Efficiency and Fairness of Equilibria
Having examined the existence of pure Nash equilibria in Adjusted Winner, we now study their
fairness and efficiency. For fairness, we observe that following.
Theorem 10. All the pure Nash equilibria of Adjusted Winner are envy-free with respect to true
valuations of the players.
Proof. Each player is guaranteed at least 50% of the maximum utility by playing truthfully, re-
gardless of what the other player does. Since a player always has truthful reporting as a possible
strategy, it must be the case that any equilibrium outcome guarantees 50% as well. Since the total
utility is 100%, the allocation is envy-free.
For efficiency, we use the well known measure of the Price of Anarchy [11, 17].
The social welfare of an allocationW is defined as the sum of the players’ utilities:
SW (W ) = uA(WA) + uB(WB).
Then the Price of Anarchy is defined as the social welfare achieved in the outcome of Adjusted
Winner (when the players are not strategic) over the social welfare achieved in the worst pure Nash
equilibrium of the procedure and measures the deterioration of the welfare due to the strategic
behaviour of the players. Our main findings are that when the procedure is equipped with an
informed tie-breaking rule (i) all the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal with respect to the true
valuations and (ii) the price of anarchy is constant; that is, each pure Nash equilibrium achieves at
least 75% of the truthful social welfare.4
We start with a lemma.
4Note that the optimal welfare is not necessarily achievable in any outcome of the procedure; however, any Nash
equilibrium of Adjusted Winner also attains a 50% fraction of the optimal since the equilibria are envy-free with
respect to the true valuations.
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Lemma 4. Let (x,x) be a pure Nash equilibrium of Adjusted Winner with informed tie-breaking
and let π∗ be the permutation that Bob chooses. Then, among all possible permutations, π∗ maxi-
mizes Alice’s utility.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists a permutation π that gives Alice a strictly larger
utility; let α be her marginal increase from π∗ to π. As discussed in Section 4, Alice can find
appropriate constants ǫ1, . . . , ǫm such that AW (x
′,x) with x′ = (x1 + ǫ1, . . . , xm + ǫm) orders the
items by π and the allocations AW (x,x) and AW (x′,x) differ only in the allocation of the split
item by by δ. Moreover, by continuity of the strategies, for each α, there exist ǫi’s such that δ is
small enough for AW (x′,x) to be better for Alice than AW (x,x).
Next we show that all equilibria are Pareto optimal.
Theorem 11. All the pure Nash equilibria of Adjusted Winner with informed tie-breaking are
Pareto optimal with respect to the true valuations a and b.
Proof. Let (x,x) be a pure Nash equilibrium of Adjusted Winner under informed tie-breaking and
let l be the item that gets split (if any, otherwise the item to the left of the boundary line). Order
Alice’s items decreasing order of ratios ai/xi and Bob’s items in increasing order of ratios bi/xi.
Since (x,x) is a pure Nash equilibrium, by Lemma 4, both players are getting their maximum
utility over all possible tie-breaking orderings of items. This means that for every item i ≤ l and
every item j ≥ l with i 6= j, it holds that
aj
xj
≥
ai
xi
and
bi
xi
≥
bj
xj
⇒
ai
xi
·
bj
xj
≤
aj
xj
·
bi
xi
,
which by Lemma 1, implies that AW (x,x) is Pareto optimal.
The Pareto optimality of a strategy profile has a direct implication on the social welfare achieved
at that profile.
Theorem 12. The Price of Anarchy of Adjusted Winner is 4/3.
Proof. Let (x,y) be any pure Nash equilibrium and let VA and VB be the utilities of Alice and
Bob respectively from the outcome of Adjusted Winner on the truthful profile (a,b), i.e. VA =
uA(AW (a,b)) and VB = uB(AW (a,b)). Since AW (x,y) is Pareto optimal by Theorem 11, the
allocation for at least one of the players, (e.g. Alice), is at least as good as that of the truthful
outcome allocation. In other words, uA(AW (x,y)) ≥ VA. On the other hand, since AW (x,y)
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is envy-free by Theorem 10, Bob’s utility from AW (x,y) is at least 1/2 · VB . Overall, the social
welfare of AW (x,y) is at least VA +
1
2
VB. Since VA = VB by equitability, the bound follows.
The bound is (almost) tight, given by the following instance with two items. Let a = (1− ǫ, ǫ)
and b = (ǫ, 1−ǫ) and consider the strategy profile x = (ǫ, 1−ǫ) and y = (ǫ, 1−ǫ). It is not hard to
see that x,y is a pure Nash equilibrium for Alice breaking ties. The social welfare of the truthful
outcome is 2 − 2ǫ, in which each player receives their most preferred item. In the equilibrium
allocation of Adjusted Winner, Alice wins the first item and the second item is split (almost) in
half. The social welfare of the mechanism is 1 + 1
2
+ o(ǫ) and the approximation ratio is (almost)
4/3. As ǫ grows smaller, the ratio becomes closer to 4/3.
Remark 1. Note that in fact it is possible that players have improved welfare at some Nash equi-
libria compared to the welfare at the truthful profile. To see this, consider an instance withm = 2
items, where Alice has valuation profile is (50, 50), while Bob has valuation (60, 40) (without nor-
malization). The optimal welfare is achieved when Bob gets the first item and Alice gets the second
one. However, the Adjusted Winner outcome has a welfare of 109.1, since the protocol transfers
a part of good 1 to Alice in order to achieve equitability. However, by providing a different input,
of (50, 50), Bob can move the boundary line and “restore” the optimal welfare outcome; this is a
Nash equilibrium when Bob breaks ties.
6 Future Work
According to Foley [9], the quintessential characteristics of fairness are envy-freeness and Pareto
optimality. We show that Adjusted Winner is guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria, which
satisfy both of these fairness notions. This attests to the usefulness and theoretical robustness of
the procedure. A very interesting direction for future work is to study the imperfect information
setting, as the Nash equilibria studied here require the players to have full information of each
other’s preferences.
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